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THE SUPREME COURT AND STATE RESTRAINTS




Over the last two decades, the United States Supreme Court has ruled on
a number of questions with a direct bearing on the accounting profession.1
Extending this legacy, the High Court has once again entered the world of the
practicing accountant to examine the Constitutional scope of State Boards of
Accountancy to restrict direct, in-person, uninvited business solicitation
within the profession. The High Court's findings and decision were delivered
recently in the case styled Edenfield v. Fane,2 which considered a sole
practitioner's challenge to solicitation restrictions adopted by the state of
Florida. This ruling carries some important implications for the rapidly evolv-
ing promotional and marketing aspects of the practice of accountancy today.
To position the Edenfield ruling in an historical perspective, the
profession's efforts at self-regulation in the area of business solicitation over
the years will be outlined first. This will entail tracing the evolution of the
solicitation issue reflected in the actions of the early Council of the American
Institute of Accountants, its successor the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (hereafter the AICPA), and the numerous State CPA
Societies throughout the country. In a like manner, the primary legal sources
supporting contemporary governmental restraints emanating from the U.S.
Constitution, along with certain federal and state dictates found in statute and
regulation, will then also be examined. Against this background, the
Edenfield case can then be dissected for the factual and legal parameters
which it imposes on state authorities intent on exerting regulatory authority
over various aspects of solicitations within the profession.'
* B.S., United States Military Academy; M.A Georgetown University; J.D. American
University; Associate Professor of Business Legal Studies, George Mason University.
1. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479 (1985) (RICO Statute); United States
v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984) (criminal investigation by the IRS); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (action for damages against accounting firm under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). See generally Louis A. Craco & Deborah E. Cooper,
The Institute As Amicus Curiae: The Key to the Courthouse, J. ACCT., Nov. 1987, at 70.
2. 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
3. The practice of advertising and the notion of competitive encroachment have long been
linked to solicitation concerns by the profession. Herman J. Lowe, Ethics In Our 100-Year
History, J. ACCT., May 1987, at 78, 82. Advertising and solicitation have come to be treated
1
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I. PROFESSIONAL SELF-REGULATION
It is both interesting and instructive to appreciate at the outset, that the
onus associated with business solicitation historically has been the cause of
considerable discomfort within the accounting profession itself. Rules against
solicitation were adopted by the early Scottish and English chartered accoun-
tants. Likewise, antisolicitation provisions were embraced from the begin-
nings of the organized profession in this country.4 A ban on client solicitation
appeared in the American accounting profession's first formal Code of Pro-
fessional Ethics becoming formally institutionalized under the Council of the
American Institute of Accountants in the year 1917. 5 Moving forward in time
however, it becomes readily apparent that in response to attitudinal and legal
pressures, the ban has substantially transmogrified under the auspices of the
AICPA in the modern era.
A. The American Institute of CPAs
The first substantive rule change modifying solicitation policy occurred
in 1948 when the AICPA membership voted to broaden the reach of the ex-
isting solicitation ban to include all potential clients rather than just those with
existing professional commitments.6 Reflecting this change, the new rule
stated:
A member shall not directly or indirectly solicit clients by circulars or
advertising, nor by personal communication or interview not warranted by
existing personal relations, and he shall not encroach upon the practice of
another public accountant. A member may furnish service to those who
request it.'
The rule remained essentially unaltered until 1962 when, largely as a matter
of format alone, the ban on encroachment was separated from the ban on
today as often indistinguishable activities. Id. at 82-85. To the extent possible, this article
will focus almost exclusively on that form of solicitation which is direct, personal and
uninvited.
4. JOHN L. CAREY, THE RISE OF THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION: FROM TECHNICIAN To
PROFESSIONAL 85, 88-90 (1969).
5. Lowe, supra note 3, at 82 (the Code stated that "[n]o member shall directly or indirectly
solicit the clients nor encroach upon the business of another member, but it is the right of any
member to give proper service and advice to those asking such service and advice").
6. AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON
SOLICITATION (1981) [hereinafter AICPA COMMITTEE REPORT], reprinted in Joint Appendix
at 29, 44, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993) (No. 91-1594). See also Lowe, supra note 3, at 82-85
(narrating a more detailed account of the evolution of solicitation rules).
7. PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, Code of Professional Ethics Rule 8 (Am. Inst. of Certified
Pub. Accts. 1948) [hereinafter AICPA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS].
[Vol. I11
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solicitation and placed in a different location within the code.8 The identical
language as to both prohibitions however, was retained. A short two years
later, the membership abruptly endorsed a proposal to outlaw all client solici-
tation. 9 The new all-encompassing proscription stated succinctly:
A member or associate shall not endeavor, directly or indirectly, to obtain
clients by solicitation."'
A series of further changes in the AICPA's solicitation ban occurred
during the 1970s starting with the decision to define advertising as a form of
solicitation and then specifically prohibit both under a single rule." In 1973,
the members adopted such a rule which read:
SOLICITATIONAND ADVERTISING. A member shall not seek to obtain
clients by solicitation. Advertising is a form of solicitation and is prohib-
ited. 2
That same year, the U.S. Department of Justice began a lengthy inquiry into
the AICPA's rules concerning solicitation, advertisement, and encroachment
with an eye to their potential anti-competitive affects. Two related Supreme
Court rulings shortly thereafter, added further impetus to the government's
concerns. In the case of Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,3 the High Court
clearly rejected the contention that the learned professions should be exempt
from the dictates of federal antitrust statutes. 4 Shortly thereafter, the court
in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona 5 further complicated matters by placing
commercial information concerning the nature, availability and price of pro-
fessional services (the essence of solicitation), under First Amendment pro-
tections. 16
In response, the AICPA rewrote its now controversial solicitation rule
with membership approval in 1978 so that it read:"
ADVERTISING AND OTHER FORMS OF SOLICITATION: A member
shall not seek to obtain clients in a manner that is false, misleading, or
8. AICPA COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 44.
9. Id.
10. AICPA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1964).
11. AICPA COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 45.
12. AICPA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Rule 5.02 (1973).
13. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
14. Id. at 793.
15. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
16. Id. at 384.
17. AICPA COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 45.
1995]
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deceptive. A direct uninvited solicitation of a specific potential client is
prohibited. 8
The Department of Justice however took umbrage with the second part of the
rule which banned all direct solicitation because it was not likewise limited
to just solicitation which was false, misleading, or deceptive. 9 When it ap-
peared that the government was prepared to challenge the ban in litigation,
the AICPA dropped that element of the rule in 1979 and adopted a slightly
modified version which stated: 20
ADVERTISING AND OTHER FORMS OF SOLICITATION: A member
shall not seek to obtain clients in a manner that is false, misleading, or
deceptive.21
Although removal of the ban satisfied the government's objections at the
time, the profession soon became concerned that new promotional practices
utilized by accountants may be harming both the profession and the general
public, 22 and furthermore, that various Boards of Accountancy and State
Societies had nonetheless retained similar prohibitions on direct, uninvited
solicitation themselves. 23 These concerns were reflected in the resolution
adopted by the membership at the AICPA's annual meeting in 1980 which
established a special committee to examine "the ramifications of the present
status of rules pertaining to direct uninvited solicitation and the legality of
such rules. '24 After an extensive study, the committee concluded that the
previous, broad, general prohibition on such solicitation could not be restored,
but that the AICPA was within its rights to ban certain specific undesirable
forms of solicitation. 2 Thus Rule 502 was modified in 1983 by adding the
sentence: "Solicitation by the use of coercion, overreaching or harassing
,conduct is prohibited. 26
B. State CPA Societies
The AICPA Special Committee on Solicitation conducted a number of
illuminating surveys in connection with their study. As a result, some very
18. AICPA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Rule 5.02 (1978).
19.- AICPA COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 45.
20. Id. at 45-46.
21. AICPA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Rule 5.02 (1978).
22. Lowe, supra note 3, at 85.
23. AICPA COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 30.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 34-40 (citing Recommendations No. 1 and 2).
26. Lowe, supra note 3, at 85.
[Vol. I11
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basic and vital data was accumulated which reflected how direct uninvited
solicitation was viewed and treated by those within the accounting profession
and by those imposing regulatory controls from outside. The data obtained
from the state CPA societies provides a case in point.
Seeking to establish the presence, location, and enforcement status of
solicitation prohibitions within the state CPA society community, the Com-
mittee reached out to fifty-three societies which included those from the
District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands as well.27
Forty-six of the societies responded. An analysis of these responses to the
committee's survey questionnaire provided some very instructive data.
Of particular relevance was the finding that all forty-six responding
societies had banned direct uninvited solicitation at some point in time, but
that forty-one had subsequently lifted the ban by the time of the survey. 28
Some societies eliminated the ban through membership referendum. In oth-
ers, the ban was automatically lifted by society bylaws which called for the
mandatory adoption of any rule changes approved in the AICPA Code at the
national level. 29 In sum, only five of forty-six societies had maintained the
prohibition. Further, one of these five indicated to the committee that al-
though it had retained the ban, the ban was not being enforced on the advice
of legal counsel.3 0
In retrospect then, it is clear that the organized profession has viewed
direct uninvited solicitation with some repugnance from the beginning. The
tradition of professional self-regulation pertaining to solicitation first estab-
lished in the English and Scottish charters was readily embraced and perpetu-
ated in this country by the AICPA and its predecessors. A dramatic turnabout
underway over the last two decades however, is now about to be finalized.
Under pressure from federal regulatory authorities, the organized accounting
profession was forced to abandon its traditional broad, self-imposed prohibi-
tion against direct uninvited solicitation. The legal foundation upon which
these new-found governmental restraints on professional self-regulation are
based will be examined next.
II. CONTEMPORARY GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION
The legal entanglements which have enveloped the question of CPA
solicitation in recent years have taken two distinct and separate forms. It is
27. AICPA COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 30.
28. Id. at 47.
29. Id. The AICPA dropped its ban in 1979. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying
text.
30. AICPA COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 47.
1995]
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important that the reader bear in mind that the legal rationale behind the fed-
eral government's objection to the profession's ban is to be distinguished from
that supporting its attack on State imposed bans. The legal underpinnings
supporting the government's assault on a self-imposed professional ban is
considered first.
A. Self-Regulation: Antitrust and Consumer Protection Concerns
Over the last two decades, AICPA rules have been eyed with suspicion
by the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department and the Federal Trade
Commission. Both organizations share overlapping antitrust jurisdiction in
certain areas, with the FTC's interest in the consumer protection aspects well
defined dating from the 1960s. Almost by definition, the act of solicitation
imparts information which in theory is market sensitive to the rational con-
sumer. Any curtailment of the free flow of price, quality, convenience, and
other information necessary to evaluate the offered service, therefore, can be
viewed as inherently anticompetitive. Further, to prohibit members from
"encroaching" on each other's clients as the AICPA Code did for so many
years, arguably contains the ingredients of a market division conspiracy. The
act of solicitation itself can also be viewed as a form of competition and there-
fore a practice to be protected and encouraged rather than banned.
It was the antitrust and consumer protection concerns such as these
which drew attention from federal authorities in recent years. As previously
chronicled, the AICPA came under strong pressure from the regulators dur-
ing the 1970s to remove this impediment to direct uninvited business solici-
tation long institutionalized in its Code of Professional Ethics.3 Against
strong inclinations to the contrary, the AICPA and its members nonetheless
formally dropped the prohibition to avoid an open confrontation with federal
authorities.3" Following the AICPA's lead, state CPA Society rules and pro-
cedures soon began to reflect this national policy change at the state level as
well.3 3 Vestiges of the solicitation ban could still be found however, in a
number of state statutes and regulations. This was soon to raise legal ques-
tions of a different nature.
31. See supra notes 11-21 and accompanying text.
32. Lowe, supra note 3, at 84-85. In recommending against a confrontation, the Special
Committee on Solicitation cited anticipated legal costs in excess of $1 million, the probability
of an unsuccessful outcome, and the subsequent damage to the profession's prestige. AICPA
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 34-38.
33. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
[Vol. I I
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B. State Regulation: Antitrust and Constitutional Concerns
In 1977, the National Association of State Boards of Accountancy (here-
after NASBA) promulgated a Model Code of Professional Conduct for the
guidance of the fifty-four Boards which comprise its membership.3 4 Among
its recommended model rules was a prohibition pertaining to solicitation
which read:
A licensee shall not by any direct personal communication solicit an en-
gagement to perform professional services (a) if the communication
would violate Rule 403 if it were a public communication; or (b) by the
use of coercion, duress, compulsion, intimidation, threats, overreaching,
or vexations or harassing conduct; or (c) where the engagement would be
for a person or entity not already a client of the licensee, unless such
person or entity has invited such communication or is seeking to secure the
performance of professional services and has not yet engaged another to
perform them. 35
Surveyed in 1980, of the fifty-one Boards of Accountancy responding,
twenty-eight indicated they either had no solicitation ban at all, or a narrow
prohibition which applied only to false, misleading, or coercive statements.36
From among all Boards which had adopted some form of the ban, a majority
had adopted the full rule recommended in the NASBA Model Code.37
It soon became apparent that this Model Code rule was of questionable
legality. By 1980, there were objections from the Attorneys General in at least
three states where the full rule had been placed in effect.38 Further, the anti-
trust implications specifically of part (c) of the rule became of concern to the
Department of Justice.3 9 Some years later, the Federal Trade Commission
pointedly advised NASBA to also delete part (b) of the rule, arguing that a ban
on overreaching or coercive solicitation practices was sufficiently ambiguous
to permit the imposition of restrictions "under circumstances that pose no
danger of harm to consumers."4 ° As a result, NASBA amended its Model
Code in 1988 to accommodate these objections.4'
34. AICPA COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 47-48.
35. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 404 (Nat'l Ass'n of State Bd. of
Acct. 1977).
36. AICPA COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 47.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 48.
39. The Department's concern surfaced first in a letter to the Vermont state legislature
which was then considering legislation in this area in 1979. Id.
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By 1991, the Accounting Boards of sixteen states, however, still con-
tained prohibitions against in-person solicitation.4 2 In four of those sixteen
states, Florida, 43 Louisiana,44 Georgia,45 and Texas, 46 the ban had also been
enacted into state statutes.4 7 The validity of Accounting Board bans, particu-
larly in those states with no authorizing state statute, has been seriously ques-
tioned under federal antitrust laws. 48 A striking extension of Constitutional
jurisprudence, however, now appears to present the most threatening chal-
lenge to government imposed solicitation restrictions affecting the account-
ing profession. This was confirmed by the Supreme Court in its recent
Edenfield ruling, which will be examined next.
III. SUPREME COURT SCRUTINY OF CPA SOLICITATION
The events which ultimately led to the High Court's Edenfield decision
were set in motion in August, 1988 when Mr. Scott Fane filed a formal com-
plaint against Mr. Fred Edenfield and his fellow members of the Florida Board
of Accountancy in the federal Court for the Northern District of Florida.49 The
complaint was based on Fane's objection to the Board's ban on direct, in-
person, uninvited solicitation.
Fane was a fully credentialed and certified CPA, possessed of a B.S. in
Accounting, a Masters Degree in Taxation, and CPA certified and licensed in
the State of New Jersey." Beginning in 1977, he was employed respectively
by Gulf and Western Corporation, Touche Ross & Company, and Deloitte,
Haskins & Sells, before he founded his own New Jersey practice in late 1984.
In 1985, Fane moved to Florida, became licensed as a CPA, and set out to
establish an accountancy practice there.
42. See Fane v. Edenfield, 945 F.2d 1514, 1516 (11th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113 S. Ct 1792
(1993).
43. FLORIDA STAT. ANN. § 473.323 (1)(1) (West 1991).
44. LA. REV. STAT. § 37.75(B); La. Adm. Code 46: XIX.507(D)(Supp 1988).
45. GA. CODE ANN. § 43-3-35(i) (1988).
46. TEXAS REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 41-a, § 6(a)(2) (West 1991).
47. Fane v. Edenfield, 945 F.2d 1514, 1516 (1 th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
48. See letter from FTC to Florida State Senator, Apr. 28, 1987 (cited as Exh. D). Id.
Compare Rhode Island Bd. of Accountancy, 107 F.T.C. 293 (1986), and U.S. v. State Board
of CPAs of Louisiana, No. 83-1947, 187 WL 7905 (E.D. La. Mar. 11, 1987).
49. Complaint For Injunctive And Declaratory Relief, Fane v. Edenfield, No. TCA 88-
40264-MMP (N.D. Fla. Sept. 13, 1990), reprinted in Joint Appendix at 1, Edenfield v. Fane,
113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993) (No. 91-1594).
50. See Affidavit Of Scott Fane, Fane v. Edenfield, No. TCA 88-40-264-MMP (N.D. Fla.




Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 11 [1995], Art. 3
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol11/iss1/3
THE SUPREME COURT AND STATE RESTRAINTS
A. Fane v. Edenfield: The Facts and Law
The formal complaint lodged by Fane in the summer of 1988 centered
specifically on Florida Statute §473.323 (1)(1) which provides that CPAs
"engaging in direct, in-person, uninvited solicitation of a specific potential
client.. ." may be subject to disciplinary action.5 The complaint also attacked
Florida Administrative Code Rule 21A-24.00(2)(3), promulgated under the
Florida Statute which defines direct, in-person, uninvited solicitation as "any
communication which directly or implicitly requests an immediate oral re-
sponse from the recipient," and pointedly prohibits "uninvited, in-person
visits or conversations or telephone calls to a specific potential client...-.
Fane contended that these restrictions seriously hampered his efforts to de-
velop a clientele of small to mid-size businesses. He pointed out to the court
the importance of being able to meet directly with those who own or manage
such businesses so that the services offered, their price, his professional ex-
perience and qualifications, and his willingness to tailor services to the
client's needs, could be fully communicated and explained. 3 Under Florida's
legal restriction Fane argued, he was denied the opportunity to both, (1) com-
municate this information to potential clients personally, and, (2) to compete
equally with other CPAs and accountants who are not affected by these re-
strictions.5
4
To support his contentions, Fane invoked First Amendment free speech
protection, and the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause. Simply
stated, his position was that truthful and accurate information concerning the
availability and terms of accounting services was a form of communication
protected by the First Amendment from government restriction such as those
imposed under Florida law.55 He further argued that the Florida restrictions
failed to pass Constitutional muster under the-equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because CPAs as a class are singled out for restric-
tion, while all others providing accounting and accounting-related services are
excluded without justifying such discriminatory treatment by relating it to a
legitimate governmental interest. 6 Accordingly, the complaint asked for
51. Complaint For Injunctive And Declaratory Relief, supra note 49, at 2-3.
52. Id. at 3.
53. Id. at 3-4.
54. Id. at 4 (stating that it was not affected because the attest function was not performed
in the course of their practices).
55. Id. at 4-5.
56. Id. at 5. Since complainants' First Amendment position alone satisfied the 11 th. Circuit
Court of Appeals, and subsequently the Supreme Court, the equal protection grounds were
never adjudicated. See Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993); Fane v. Edenfield, 945
F.2d 1514 (1l th Cir. 1991), af'd, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
111I19951
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relief in the form of a court injunction against state enforcement of the solici-
tation restrictions, and a declaration that the restrictions in question were in
violation of the Constitution.5"
In support of its answer denying the Fane complaint, the Florida Board
of Accountancy submitted an affidavit from one Mr. Louis W. Dooner to place
the solicitation ban in some historical perspective and articulate the basic
public policy objectives it seeks to attain.58 The Dooner justifications for
Florida's ban were then rebutted by Fane in a supplemental affidavit. 9 This
exchange provided a rare insight into the competing practical interests per-
taining to professional solicitation which lay beneath the legal issues.
Dooner argued that the only reason for the existence of a regulated public
accounting profession is to protect the independence of the "attest" function,
whereby the CPA renders an opinion on the financial statements of others
based on a professional audit in accordance with Generally Accepted Audit-
ing Standards.6" This independence is compromised by solicitation because
the professional thereby becomes beholden to the client.6 The ban on solici-
tation, Dooner contended, was not designed to protect the public from solici-
tors, but rather to protect the users of CPA financial statements.62 To illus-
trate, he emphasized how narrowly tailored the ban was, and cited some com-
mon forms of solicitation that were still permitted under its provisions.63 The
only type of solicitation prohibited by the state, Dooner argued, is that which
places the potential client in a position of having to make an immediate oral
response.6 4 Such a situation is undesirable, he explained, because it invites
57. Complaint For Injunctive And Declaratory Relief, supra note 49, at 5.
58. See Affidavit Of Louis W. Dooner, Fane v. Edenfield, No. TCA 88-40264-MMP (N.D.
Fla. Sept. 13, 1990), reprinted in, Joint Appendix at 16, Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792
(1993) (No. 91-1594). Mr. Dooner's distinguished career encompassed leadership roles in
AICPA, NASBA, and the Florida State Board of Accountancy as its chairman. Id. at 16-17.
59. Supplemental Affidavit Of Scott Fane, Fane v. Edenfield, No. TCA 88-40264-MMP
(N.D. Fla. Sept. 13, 1990), reprinted in, Joint Appendix at 25, Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct.
1792 (1993) (No. 91-1594).
60. Affidavit of Louis N. Dooner, supra note 58, at 19.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 20.
63. (1) May a CPA attend trade shows, luncheon clubs and other such meetings and engage
in direct, in-person, solicitation? Yes, because those in attendance by their presence, have
issued an invitation to be solicited. (2) May a CPA send a personal letter to a potential client
requesting an appointment to discuss his qualifications to render services? Yes, because the
decision to enter into the conversation rest[s] with the potential client. (3) May a CPA send
brochures and other advertising material to a particular member of management of a potential
client? Yes, this activity . . . places responsibility for initiating personal contact with the
potential client.
Id. at 22-23.
64. Id. at 20.
[Vol. I11
10
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 11 [1995], Art. 3
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol11/iss1/3
THE SUPREME COURT AND STATE RESTRAINTS
"overreaching and vexatious" conduct by the CPA, and also places him in
a compromising position wherein he may be willing to "bend the rules" in
order to secure business. 65
Fane countered first with the observation that a large percentage of prac-
ticing CPAs today never exercise the attest function.6 6 This is particularly apt
for that growing segment of the profession with specialties in areas such as
tax, financial planning, employee benefits, management information systems,
estate planning, and litigation support.67 Furthermore, he noted that there
were other factors, perhaps more important than the attest function, which
distinguish CPAs from accountants and other financial professionals.
68
Among these, are the fact that CPAs alone must demonstrate their educational
background, competence, expertise and good moral character through a
licensure process, that they are required to maintain their professionalism
through continuing education, and that under Florida law, certain communi-
cations between only CPAs and their clients are protected as to their confiden-
tiality.69
Pertaining to the notion that direct, uninvited solicitation places the CPA
in a compromising position, Fane retorted that the scenario was "inherently
implausible" based on his own professional experience with solicitation as a
sole practitioner and as a CPA with two major national firms.70 Any tempta-
tion to bend the rules, he argued, is deterred by the certain knowledge that
such conduct can result in a practitioner's loss of license, incarceration, and
financial ruin. 7' Furthermore, he noted, professionals should be expected to
recognize that any businessman interested in an undeserved "clean" financial
opinion, is certainly not a promising long-term client.
72
Following a full hearing, the U.S. District Court found the Florida ban
to be unconstitutional, granted Fane's motion for a summary judgement, and
enjoined the Board of Accountancy from enforcing the ban as to "CPAs who
seek clients through in-person, direct, uninvited solicitation in the business
context." 73 The decision was then appealed and accepted for review by the
65. Id. at 23.
66. Supplemental Affidavit Of Scott Fane, supra note 59, at 25-26.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 26.
69. I.
70. Id. at 27.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Fane v. Edenfield, No. TCA 88-40264-MMP (N.D. Fla. Sept. 13, 1990); reprinted in,
Joint Appendix at 78, Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993) (No. 91-1594), aff'd, 945
F.2d 1514 (llth Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
1995]
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U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit. Applying its own analysis as to the
constitutionality of the ban, the Appeals Court affirmed the District Court's
ruling.7 4 Responding to an appeal from the Circuit Court ruling, the U.S.
Supreme Court heard oral arguments in December, 1992, deciding the case in
April the following year. 5
B. High Court Analysis and Ruling
The starting point for the Supreme Court's analysis was to emphasize the
societal value which solicitation can provide in a business context. Through
solicitation, the seller can "educate the market and stimulate demand" while
efficiently targeting only the most likely consumers. 76 Likewise the buyer is
afforded the opportunity to meet and evaluate the solicitor, and to compare in
detail the offered product or service with available alternatives. For both
parties, solicitation allows for a personal interchange amenable to formulat-
ing "the desired form for the transaction or professional relationship." 7 7 It was
emphasized also that these benefits are particularly significant pertaining to
products such as professional services offered by a CPA, which are not uni-
form or standard." The Court concluded that First Amendment protections
apply to this type of commercial expression.7 9 It was observed that to deny
CPAs and their clients these benefits would threaten the larger societal inter-
ests in broad access to complete and accurate commercial information. 80 The
Court emphasized that it is primarily for the speaker and the audience to
assess the value of information in the marketplace, not the government.8 I
For the government to ban personal solicitation by CPAs such as Fane,
the justices felt it must be demonstrated first that Florida's interests in regu-
lating this form of commercial speech are substantial, and second, that the ban
"advances these interests in a direct and material way."8 2 The Court agreed
74. Fane v. Edenfield, 945 F.2d 1514 (11th. Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
75. Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
76. Id. at 1797.
77. Id. at 1798.
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).
80. Id. (citing Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 377-78 (1977), and Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 561-562
(1980)).
81. Id.
82. Id. The Court applied the test developed in the case of Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). Id. at 1798-1802. The
third element of this test, never reached by the Fane Court, requires the restriction on
commercial speech to be in reasonable proportion to the government interests sought to be
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with the Florida Board's contention that one of the substantial government
interests at play was to insure that consumers were protected from fraudulent
or deceptive speech citing that fact that some 25 states and the District of
Columbia presently ban CPA solicitation which falls into those categories. 83
Likewise, the Court acknowledged that solicitation "may be pressed with such
frequency or vehemence as to intimidate, vex, or harass"84 which gives rise
to another substantial state interest in regulation, i.e. that of protecting the
privacy of potential clients at the receiving end of such solicitation.8 5
The Court also found itself in agreement with the other substantial inter-
est claimed by the Florida Board. 86 The Board argued that both perceived and
actual CPA independence in performing the audit and attest functions is a
proper subject of state regulation. Personal, uninvited solicitation is undesir-
able because it invites ethical lapses and undermines public confidence
largely by virtue of its commercial rather than professional character. 7 Not-
ing its previous approval of state-imposed ethical standards in other licensed
professions,88 the Court likewise endorsed the legitimacy of Florida's inter-
est in maintaining CPA independence and protecting against conflicts of in-
terest in the accounting profession.89
Satisfied that the Florida Board had met the "substantial interest" test,
the Court then turned to the second requirement necessary for the ban to meet
Constitutional muster, i.e., that it directly and materially advance the state's
interest. 90 Searching for evidence that might support this requirement, the
Court came up short. Citing a series of previous cases, the Court explained
that Florida must "demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its
restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree." 91 In the absence
served. Id. at 1798.
83. Id. at 1799.
84. Id.
85. Id. (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 462 (1978)).
86. Id. at 1799-1800.
87. Id. at 1799.
88. Id. (citing to Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978), Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 766 (1976) and
Nat'l Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. U.S., 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978)).
89. Id. (quoting U.S. v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984) that CPAs must
"maintain total independence" and act with "complete fidelity to the public trust" in performing
their auditing function).
.90. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. In corollary form, the Court stated the "the
regulation may not be sustained it if provides only ineffective or remote support for the
government's purpose." Id. at 1800.
91. Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1800 (1993) (citing to Zauder v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 648-649 (1985); Bolger v.
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of studies or even anecdotal evidence which demonstrates that a ban on direct,
uninvited CPA business solicitation somehow actually engenders fraud, over-
reaching or compromised independence, the Court felt that the Florida Board
had failed to satisfy this requirement.9 2
Further undermining the Florida Board's contention that the ban was
effective to achieve the state's interest were some contradictory conclusions
drawn by the AICPA's Special Committee on Solicitation which did not es-
cape the Court's attention.9 3 Reinforcing the skepticism of the Justices, the
AICPA Committee reported that it was "unaware of the existence of any
empirical data supporting the theories that CPAs (a) are not independent of
clients obtained by direct uninvited solicitation, or (b) do not maintain their
independence in mental attitude toward those clients subjected to direct un-
invited solicitation by another CPA."9 4 In sum, the report cited a lack of evi-
dence that a CPA who engages in personal solicitation is somehow more in-
clined to sacrifice his professional standards in doing so than those who rou-
tinely solicit by mail or advertising. 95
On this same point, the Court also surveyed the recent scholarly litera-
ture pertaining to the accounting profession for illumination. There, it discov-
ered commentary to the effect that it is the CPA relationship, too dependent
upon or involved with a long-standing client, that presents the main threat to
professional independence. 96 The business executive seeking an unjustified
audit opinion is "less likely to turn to a stranger who has solicited him than to
pressure his existing CPA, with whom he has our ongoing, personal relation
and over whom he may also have some financial leverage." 97 For a lack of
sufficient evidence from any source than that the Board's claim that its solici-
tation ban directly and materially advanced the state's interest in guarding the
independence and integrity of its licensed CPAs, the second element of the
Central Hudson test98 was not met. The Court therefore rejected the Board's
Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 n.20 (1983); Lininark Associates, Inc. v.
Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95 (1977)).
92. Id. The Court implied that the need to establish these assertions was perhaps of increased
importance in light of the fact that 21 states placed no restrictions of any kind on CPA
solicitation. Id.
93. Id. at 1801 (stating that "The Report contradicts rather than strengthens the Board's
submissions").
94. AICPA COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 38.
95. Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1801 (1993).
96. Id. at 1801 (citing PHILLIP G. COTTELL & TERRY M. PERLIN, ACCOUNTING ETHICS 39-
40 (1990) and GARY J. PREVITS, THE SCOPE OF CPA SERVICES: A STUDY OF THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF INDEPENDENCE AND THE PROFESSION'S ROLE IN SOCIETY
142 (1985)).
97. Id. at 1801.
98. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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theory that its ban was a constitutionally permitted restriction on CPA com-
mercial speech.
Two additional theories of lesser force were advanced by the state in
attempting to establish the constitutionality of Florida's CPA solicitation ban.
Both met unsympathetic receptions. The first was the contention that the
Florida ban was not designed to restrict the content of CPA speech, but merely
restrict it to a reasonable time, place and manner which had been deemed
constitutionally acceptable under an earlier ruling by the Court.99 Even
though the ban might touch on expression involving a particular subject, i.e.,
solicitation of business, only its time, place, and manner were of regulatory
concern. 00 Passing over this proposition as "open to serious doubt," the
Edenfield Court noted that even such content-neutral restrictions as the Board
claimed its ban to be, must still be demonstrated to further the state's interest
in "a direct and effective way." 1'l Having failed to meet this burden earlier
under the main theory of its case, the Court likewise rejected this subsequent
contention.
Finally, the Florida Board argued that its broad ban was justified because
the situation requires a "prophylactic" rule.10 2 Such a rule is necessary, the
Board contended, since direct, verbal solicitation cannot be regulated other-
wise in light of the fact that "the regulator cannot know what was in fact said,
or the tone and manner in which the statement was delivered."' 03 Furthermore,
it is in the state's interest to prevent the fraud, overreaching or misrepresen-
tation that can flow from direct solicitation before it occurs. 0 4 Summarizing
this theoretical position, the Board argued the State's "inherent inability to
regulate such solicitation and the profound potential for abuse outweigh the
CPA's interest in the potential employment that may be gained .... "I0
In response, the Court reiterated the longstanding admonition that
"broad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect." 06 It then
99. Id. This argument is fully developed as applied to the solicitation ban in question in
Petitioners' Brief On The Merits, supra note at 33-42, Fane v. Edenfield, No. TCA 88-40264-
MMP (N.D. Fla. Sept. 13, 1990).
100. See Id. at 1801 (citing Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. Public Service
Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 530, 544-45 (1980)).
101. Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1801 (1993) (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781,800(1989)).
102. Petitioners' Brief On The Merits, supra note 99, at 23-25.
103. Id. at 23-24.
104. Id. at 24.
105. Id. at 25.
106. Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1803 (1993) (stating "Precision of regulation must
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challenged the analogy drawn by the Board between its ban and the state of
Ohio's ban which prohibits direct solicitation by its attorneys." 7 The attor-
ney ban was held to be constitutional by the Court in the case of Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Association. °8 Noting that the constitutionality of such bans
depends on who the parties are and the circumstances of the solicitation on a
case-by-case basis, the Court stressed that its Orhalik ruling made clear that
broad prophylactic rules were permissible only in situations "inherently con-
ducive to overreaching and other forms of misconduct." 109 Differentiations
between Ohralik and Edenfield were then drawn based on the disparity be-
tween the fact situations in the two cases, and the dissimilarity as to the func-
tion performed by the two different professions. Because the attorney is
"trained in the art of persuasion" and can solicit "unsophisticated, injured, or
distressed lay persons" "0 the Court argued, the potential is greater for over-
reaching than in the case of a CPA whose training emphasizes independence
and objectivity,"' and whose solicitation is directed at sophisticated, expe-
rienced business executives." 2 Not only did this theory fall short in the eyes
of the Court as inapplicable to accountant solicitation, even prophylactic rules
must be shown to advance protection against real dangers, a burden the
Florida Board was not able to establish to the Court's satisfaction from the
beginning." 3
be touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms" and citing NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
107. Id. at 1802-03.
108. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
109. Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1802 (1993).
110. Id. at 1802.
111. Id. at 1802-03 (citing H. MAGILL AND GERY PREVITS, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES: AN INTRODUCTION 105-08 (1991)).
112. Id. at 1803. "The manner in which a CPA like Fane solicits business is conducive to
rational and considered decision-making by the prospective client, in sharp contrast to the
'uninformed acquiescence' to which the accident victims in Ohralik were prone"). Id. For
the possible impact of the Edenfield ruling on the extent to which states may regulate attorney
in-person solicitation, see J. Fisher, Justices Revisit the Solicitation Question, NAT'L L.J.,
Sept. 27, 1993, at 38.
113. Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1804 (1993) (J. O'Connor dissenting). As the
lone dissent in the Edenfield decision, Justice O'Connor would have applied the precedent
established in Ohralik because she could see no "constitutional difference" between an in-
person solicitation ban applicable to attorneys, and the same ban applicable to CPAs. Id.
Critical of the majority's approach as too narrow, Justice O'Connor argued that the States
have the authority to limit CPA solicitation even though it is not harmful to the listener, if it
is "inconsistent with the speaker's membership in a learned profession and therefore damaging
to the profession and society at large." Id. (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel
of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 676-77 (1985)).
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IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR ACCOUNTING PRACTICE
The accounting profession has been no more successful in staving off the
inexorable march of commercialization than have the legal, medical, and most
other learned professions. As the practice of accounting gradually moved
away from its traditional professional moorings toward a more modern busi-
ness footing, changes ensued. One of the most dramatic changes to emerge
during this transition was the transformation of client solicitation from its
early status as something akin to unprofessional pandering, to an indispens-
able marketing tool.
Looking back, it is now apparent that the first public policy breakthrough
with direct impact on this transformation was the Supreme Court 1975
Goldfarb ruling, which for the first time viewed the learned professions as
business enterprises and therefore subject to federal antitrust statutes." 4
Pressure from federal regulatory officials shortly thereafter caused the orga-
nized accounting profession to essentially drop its longstanding ban on direct
uninvited solicitation due to the anticompetitive implications flowing from
the rule. In line with the trend which was then becoming clear, the National
Association of State Boards of Accountancy soon amended its model code to
eliminate a recommended solicitation ban as well. Some states however, have
continued to carry such bans into the 1990s.
Once again, recent Supreme Court concerns further altered the public
policy status of CPA solicitation in the recent Edenfield ruling. Now the
object of First Amendment analysis, CPA solicitation for the first time gained
High Court recognition as a form of commercial speech. With this new sta-
tus came significant Constitutional protection against governmental restric-
tions. Indeed, it is this very protection, the Edenfield court instructs us, that
the Florida restriction was unable to overcome.
The implications of the High Court's Edenfield decision are both legal
and practical. From a legal point of view, the vestiges of broad state prohi-
bitions against CPA solicitation so common in the past, can be expected to
disappear. Through either legal challenge, nonenforcement, or statutory
amendment, the clear intent of the Edenfield ruling must eventually be given
full force and effect nation-wide.
On the practical side, the ruling reinforces shifting CPA attitudes and
removes a broad area of modern accountant promotional activity from gov-
ernmental regulation. In connection with the work of the AICPA Special
Committee on Solicitation, and attitudinal survey of its members was con-
114. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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ducted in 1981."1 Although in the aggregate, a majority of members still
favored the traditional ban at that point in time, it was clear that the younger
generation of practitioners with fewer years of practice were more permissive
in their attitudes toward the appropriateness of CPA direct, uninvited solici-
tation.1 6 In part, this is no doubt attributable to the mounting competitive
pressures and changing nature of today's accounting practice.
The promotion and marketing of accounting services has become indis-
pensable by virtue of the commercial demands of a successful accounting
practice. Personal direct contact is particularly well suited to the promoting
of accounting services for a number of important reasons. In the first instance,
the market for accounting products itself is relatively small and passive.
Furthermore, the complexity of such services places a disproportionate em-
phasis on the need to explain and clarify the product to potential users. And
finally, the force of personal persuasion is often required to attract the new
client away from his current provider.' 7 With its practical importance on the
rise, the High Court's Edenfield ruling clears the way for direct, uninvited
client solicitation to assume its natural place in the competition to provide
quality accounting services unrestricted to any significant degree by state
regulation.
115. AICPA COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 48-49. The survey went out to a random
sample of 2,519 AICPA members stratified according to types of employment such as national
CPA firms, medium-sized or local firms, industry, government, education, and other. Id.
116. Id. at 49.
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